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Abstract. The article mainly discusses Edward Dembowski's philosophy of creation in connection 
with his Hegelian influences, leftist associations and the ongoing discussion in nineteenth century 
romantic polish philosophy. The nineteenth century, with its German Idealism and French 
tendency to act in the name of social rights, had introduced new ideas to work with during harsh 
historical times. Dembowski, amongst other Poles, was the closest to constructing a coherent 
metaphysical system for the philosophy of creation (filozofia twórczości). In the paper, I try to 
show a part of his intellectual evolution, stretching from defining philosophy as knowledge itself 
in the form of a Hegelian system, through his critique of Hegel's and Cieszkowski's systems, up to 
his own established system – the philosophy of creation and its social connections. I also speculate 
about which of his philosophical ideas can remain relevant today. 
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Why Polish Philosophy Does Not Exist is the title of Barry Smith’s article in 
which the author discusses the problem of “Continental Philosophy” and 
scientific philosophy. He describes the first one in contrast to the philosophical 
purity of Polish Philosophy that held a strong connection with logic and science. 
Kazimierz Twardowski had a great influence on that tradition. He encouraged 
his disciples to study mathematics and science, and instilled a passion for clarity, 
rigor and seriousness.1 These ventures were part of an attempt to create 
“collaboration between mathematicians and philosophers working in the area of 
logic”2 in Lvov at the beginning of the twentieth century. In addition to that, 
logic, and mathematics with its scientific objectivity, stood outside the political 
discourse so they could be taught regardless of current political system. It’s 
important to say that Smith understands by Polish Philosophy the one made by 
thinkers living at least after the year 1894, that will be later known as the Lvov–
Warsaw School. However, he distinguishes this group only to show that the term 
Polish Philosophy is a misnomer, an inaccurate designation. Kotarbiński’s 
1 SMITH [2006], p. 26.
2 Ibid., p. 24.
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philosophical solutions were equal to Brentano’s; their thoughts are philosophies 
per se. The Viena Circle was also at “the rise of scientific philosophy [which] is 
an inevitable concomitant of the simple process of modernization”.3 That 
is mainly why Polish Philosophy is, according to Smith, Austrian Philosophy. It 
is all a part of an inevitable, unifying process.
The demarcation line drawn by Smith is quite clear. Everything except the above 
mentioned obtains the problematic status of “Continental Philosophy” and is 
involved in scandal. This includes Hegelian, Heideggerian and Habermasian 
thought, as well as Deriddian and Irigarian.4 These types of thinkers have their 
moment of unity which is “antipathy to science, or more generally, antipathy to 
learning and to scholarly activity, to all the normal bourgeois purposes of the 
Western university”5 as Smith ironically states. It’s a philosophy that heavily 
uses irony and pseudo-scientific jargonizing language inspired by sociology and
psychoanalysis. He announces that empirical, more scientific philosophy, rather 
than German idealism tradition, constitutes the contemporary mainstream.6
However, this proposal is the result of a self-proclaimed establishment of the 
title of the real philosophy determined by active participation in the scientific, 
academic discourse. Thus, it defines its place in close relation to Science. Smith 
tries to depreciate Polish efforts to project any fertile thought other than an 
analytical one. The attempts of Polish romantic thinkers and writers were 
allegedly “overwhelmed by more forward-looking (…) ‘positivists’ in Warsaw”.7
While he neglects the role of the early nineteenth century Polish philosophical 
attempts to introduce philosophical reflection about nation and society on 
a wider scale, he simultaneously favors late nineteenth century logic and 
positivist traces which will emerge in the twentieth century Lvov-Warsaw 
School.
Even if we agreed with some of Smith’s critiques of contemporary “Continental 
Philosophy”8 his inaccurate and too general definition of “Continental Philosophy” 
is created only in opposition to science-oriented philosophy that, on its own, has 
no understanding of itself. Also, he misses at least two points. Firstly, what he 
calls a philosophical scandal is the type of discussion conducted independently, 
beyond ordinary, well-established scholarly interests. He narrows the problem of 
philosophy to a purely academic value. Secondly, although he tries to be 
respectful of different points of view, he is still very attached to the analytical 
perspective, which is highly promoted. He does not transcend his own scientific 
3 Ibid., p. 34.
4 Ibid., p. 36.
5 Ibid., p. 19.
6 Ibid., p. 33.
7 Ibid., p. 32.
8 Sometimes in its ambiguity and hyper relativization it is hard to find accurate meaning.
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perspective to ask a philosophical question about philosophy itself. He assumes 
that the philosophical future in science is self-explanatory. I disagree with the 
statement that there is no Polish philosophy and also that a philosophical future 
can only be marked and determined by “a simple process of modernization”. 
Those intellectual eras that are discarded without a second thought by the author 
as attempts which are not philosophical enough triggered to the ones he refers to 
as philosophies per se. The question about our present, and consequently our 
future, is also a question of our relation to the past.
In The Legend of Young Poland, Polish thinker Stanisław Brzozowski states 
something different, opposite even to Smith’s thought. He says that the way we 
– Poles – treat our own intellectual tradition is scandalous. Brzozowski writes
between 1906 and 1909 that Polish romanticism is still unknown to us. We still 
have to understand and interpret its spiritual atmosphere.9 It’s not about empty 
curiosity. Young Poland tried to understood itself via its interpretation of 
romantic thought; it was the ground work. They were lured by the distorted and 
fatalistic aspects of romanticism.10 Brzozowski was well aware11 that Young 
Poland saw romanticism in its appearance on the stage of history, which was 
only a superficial understanding. We need to understand that concepts of 
freedom, independence or Volksgeist, were acts of their life; they emerged from 
the need to create independent national intellectual ground. Nineteenth century 
intellectuals wanted to see themselves as the creators of tamed historical forces. 
Polish writers and thinkers, detached exiles from intellectual ground, had their 
own practical and common goal: to create, based exclusively on their own 
individual spirits, a national, intellectual base on which they could build their 
self-consciousness.12 Despite all flamboyant intentions they needed external 
philosophical inspirations.
Edward Dembowski13 in his Outlines of the developing of philosophical 
concepts in Germany states: “There are two (...) nations that cultivate 
philosophy: Germany and France, but each of them, in their own proper spirit, 
separately develop their field of thought”.14 He states that Slavs are only at the 
beginning of their philosophical journey.15 The development of Polish thought 
went in two main directions: the German abstract, idealistic and metaphysical
tradition, and the French practical tradition, the tendency to apply ideas directly 
9 BRZOZOWSKI [1910], p. 192.
10 Ibid., p. 195.
11 Ibid., p. 213.
12 Ibid., p. 205.
13 Polish philosopher, literary critic, and activist, also called the red castellan’s-son, organizer of an 
unsuccessful Cracow Uprising, lived between 1822 and 1846, died at 27th of February in Pogórze 
Cracow shot by Austrian soldiers.
14 DEMBOWSKI [1955], p. 298.
15 Ibid., p. 295.
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9 BRZOZOWSKI [1910], p. 192.
10 Ibid., p. 195.
11 Ibid., p. 213.
12 Ibid., p. 205.
13 Polish philosopher, literary critic, and activist, also called the red castellan’s-son, organizer of an 
unsuccessful Cracow Uprising, lived between 1822 and 1846, died at 27th of February in Pogórze 
Cracow shot by Austrian soldiers.
14 DEMBOWSKI [1955], p. 298.
15 Ibid., p. 295.
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into socio-economic context. The first one was associated with post-Kantian, 
mainly Hegelian thought, and gave birth to attempts to create a national 
philosophy (Trentowski, Libelt). The latter, with political doctrines such as 
millenarianism, gave birth to its Polish equivalent – messianism (Mickiewicz, 
Słowacki).16 The third way was the combination of those two (Cieszkowski, 
Dembowski).
Polish messianism was firmly rooted in the contemporary Europe intellectual 
context.17 Not only Poland, but also France was called The Christ of Nations.18
The idea of anew revelation and everlasting peace was often associated with 
deep social changes that could be achieved by a certain task. Count August 
Cieszkowski directly calls it the philosophy of action.19 However, the ways this 
task can be realized are significantly different. Mickiewicz’s position shows an 
intuitive attitude towards earthly salvation, whereas Cieszkowski thinks that 
without theoretical reflexion, action is worthless. All of those programs were 
realized, almost wholly, in the context of history. Thus historiosophy, as 
a philosophy, tries to understand the past and to project specific actions. It is 
somehow the legacy of German thought. Mickiewicz could not fully appreciate 
that tradition. It comes from his radical irrationalism and faith in mysticism. 
Mickiewicz’s disdainful and frivolous attitude towards the limitations and 
strictness of the philosophical method was his own limitation. Total embodying 
faith in which he saw freedom was the weakness of Polish culture.
Cieszkowski, however, values German idealism, especially the Hegelian 
dialectic method that he used to conduct an immanent critique of Hegel’s 
philosophy, in an attempt to “overcome the limits of all philosophy past and 
present”, to process abstract reflectiveness into action.20 He was one of many 
commentators and critics of the Hegelian system. Dembowski, commenting on
the situation in 1843, states that, “No firm progress has been made (except by 
Cieszkowski, who might do it) in areas of expertise”,21 and Cieszkowski was the 
one to build the new philosophical system, which would be an emanation of 
the Hegelian system. Cieszkowski wanted to transform abstract reflectiveness 
into life by establishing a corrected version of the system in philosophy of action 
(filozofia czynu)22. This would involve: 1) adding future to the organism of 
history so it would become an integral part; 2) changing the value of an 
independent unit, from a tool through which reason works to being self-aware, 
16 WALICKI [1970], p. 29.
17 Loc. cit.
18 It was announced in “Globe” in 29 of January, 1832.
19 WALICKI [1970], p. 21.
20 KOZŁOWKI [1999], p. 11.
21 DEMBOWSKI [1955], p. 397.
22 Ibid., p. 406.
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creating people; 3) changing the arrangement of categories present in history. 
Cieszkowski wanted to apply categories that can be traced in nature and spirit to 
Hegel’s historiosophy, which for him is insufficient. The Polish author 
rearranges the order of history and claims that it can be adjusted with three 
categories: a) the past, an age of beauty which is associated with emotion and 
was developed in Antiquity through the perfection of art; b) the present, the age 
of thought, which is associated with thinking and has developed throughout 
Christianity through the perfection of knowledge in philosophy; c) the future, the 
age of goodness, which is associated with action (act) and will be “developed in 
the world of the future, when knowledge will come to life while becoming an act
and will give birth to absolute virtue”,23 all of the acts are going to be conscious, 
and people will become not thinking or feeling beings, but creative ones; it will 
be the time of universal reintegration. Just as Christianity was the age of human-
God, the third one will become the age of Godlike-humanity. This religion will 
be the highest development of the “eternal religion” in the form of Paraclete 
Religion.24 Liturgy will become art, science will replace dogma etc. There will 
be no priests, only artists, officials and scientists – all working for the public 
good.25
Kozłowski points out that Cieszkowski uses philosophy, its dialectic method, as 
merely an instrument. It loses its independence. “Philosophy itself, even in its 
most perfect shape given to it by Hegel, becomes a historical phenomenon, 
essentially incapable of expressing the sense of history as a whole. It must, 
therefore give way – together with art – to another realm of absolute spirit, i.e. 
religion”.26 It serves as a means, and not as a goal itself. Cieszkowski becomes 
Hegel’s competitor instead of a teacher of the practical use of dialectics.27 By 
establishing the historiosophical problem of Slavs on the level of absolute spirit, 
a problem which in Hegel’s system is solved within the framework of objective 
spirit, Cieszkowski wants to change an individual’s own influence on history 
from a tool of “cunning reason”, to a “conscious and independent” executor of 
principles. Yet the shift only establishes how individuals might view the content 
and does not answer the question: what will the content of the future be?
Kozłowski comments on this attempt that “instead of concrete analyses of 
actually functioning institutions of ethnicity, Cieszkowski presents mostly 
sublime declarations, wishful thinking and expectations that individuals will 
become ‘artists, scientists and public people’”.28 In conclusion Cieszkowski’s 
23 Ibid., p. 408.
24 Paraclete (παράκλητος) means advocate or helper. In Christianity, the term paraclete most 
commonly refers to the Holy Spirit.
25 WALICKI [1970], pp. 67–69.
26 KOZŁOWKI [1999], p. 12.
27 Ibid., p. 13.
28 Ibid., p. 14.
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27 Ibid., p. 13.
28 Ibid., p. 14.
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attempt did not fulfill its obligation. Despite efforts to expand the organism of 
history, by shifting the categories and setting historiosophy as a realm of 
absolute spirit, only to extend the dialectic competencies that could predict 
future, he overestimated the possibilities of his programme.29
Nonetheless, Dembowski had a deep respect for Cieszkowski’s attempt to open 
the prospect for the future via a reinterpretation of Hegelian system. Much like 
the Count, Dembowski at the very beginning accepts Hegel’s thought as an 
absolute reference point. In his first article, the author specifies significant 
problems which will be held later in his writings. He defines philosophy as 
Knowledge, which thanks to Hegel is no longer a love of knowledge (wisdom) 
but autonomous Knowledge itself. In addition, it enriches all human activities by 
giving them meaning.30 He also complains that Poles are not interested in 
philosophy, and don’t like to think at all. During 1842-1843, he published the 
culture-forming “Przegląd Naukowy” in which he promoted philosophy, gave 
lectures on the Hegelian system and on problems with our philosophical 
passivity.
In his text Present idealistic position, Dembowski states that the ultimate 
purpose of human existence is the happiness of others. That happiness can only 
be realized in a community. This understanding comes from within and is given 
through God’s love. However, love deprived of thinking is madness. It is 
necessary to find a thought that will elevate like a spring all cognitive functions 
to knowledge. Knowledge is the motion and force of the world.31 “Progress is 
the nature of thought (...) the very thought itself”.32 Thought must objectify itself 
and that process is necessary to produce self-consciousness. At this point he 
states that philosophy requires being Christian,33 but in contrast to Cieszkowski, 
he does not simply leave the future of societies in God’s hands but underlines 
Christianity’s value as mature thought. In order to create community, the 
knowing of truth has to be combined with educated feeling.34
Dembowski’s own intellectual source of inspiration was, besides Hegel’s system, 
philosophy of action. He critiques the arrangement of the categories proposed by 
Cieszkowski (emotion linked with beauty, thinking linked with truth and action 
linked with goodness). He states that emotion corresponds not with beauty, but 
with life, the primary unconscious act, whereas beauty is created only by the 
harmony of emotional engagement and thought35. As for the basis for the whole 
29 Ibid., p. 15.
30 DEMBOWSKI [1955], p. 3–4.
31 Ibid., p. 27-36.
32 Ibid., p. 34.
33 Ibid., p. 37.
34 Ibid., p. 39–40.
35 Ibid., p. 408.
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system, chosen categories have to be designed as a harmonized whole. “The 
most perfect of them must be unity with the previous two – action is only 
a symptom of a conscious thought, not the unity of thoughts and feelings”36
because that is creation. Dembowski sees what Cieszkowski omitted – if
philosophy is to retain its autonomy, and not become a means to some goal, it 
has to remain at the level of absolute spirit. If philosophy’s goal is to determine 
the historical goal of a nation, philosophy ceased to be itself, and it becomes 
only a justifying rhetorical technique.
He gives a preliminary draft of his own system in the article Position of the 
future of philosophy, where he presents the philosophy of creation that reveals 
the nature of all elements(emotion, thought, creation) thanks to Hegelian 
analysis. It is progress. Thus, he makes an attempt to create a proposition of 
a System of Knowledge that would be based on the mentioned elements, would 
take account of them in relation to the entire system as an organic whole and 
would determine which fields they correspond with. “Creation is harmonized 
emotion and thought, creation is identical with being”37 and through that 
principle the whole system will be developed. 1) Emotion as the most detached 
moment of creation, the most abstract one, not realized yet is logic; 2) a higher 
degree than emotion, its negation is thought – passed into reality. Thought knows 
but does not know that it knows, so its nature; 3) only the fully developed 
thought that knows and feels that it knows what and why it feels is creation – the 
field of the spirit.38 All of those domains continue to be analogically developed, 
for instance: “thought as a thought is: 1) emotion, 2) thought, 3) creation.”, and
then in the footnote: “thought as a thought being creation is completely different 
to creation as creation being thought; the first one is organism, and the second 
knowledge”.39 But, what is most interesting is the author’s arrangement of 
history. After dividing it into 1) people of the east; 2) Hebrews, Greeks, Romans;
3) the history of Christian people,40 he says of the last period, “the third period
will be the future. It will develop according to the thought divisions, and finally 
knowledge will go in life”.41 He proposes this fractal historiosophical system of 
history that is never closed, always in movement and progressing towards the 
next whatever. He does not promote Polishness nor Slavs. He only describes 
the significance of history and states that the vacant position is up for grabs, 
history has not finished yet.
36 Ibid., p. 409.
37 Ibid., vol. III, p. 123.
38 Ibid. p. 124–125.
39 Ibid., p. 126.
40 That has its own inner divisions
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attempt did not fulfill its obligation. Despite efforts to expand the organism of 
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absolute spirit, only to extend the dialectic competencies that could predict 
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philosophy of action. He critiques the arrangement of the categories proposed by 
Cieszkowski (emotion linked with beauty, thinking linked with truth and action 
linked with goodness). He states that emotion corresponds not with beauty, but 
with life, the primary unconscious act, whereas beauty is created only by the 
harmony of emotional engagement and thought35. As for the basis for the whole 
29 Ibid., p. 15.
30 DEMBOWSKI [1955], p. 3–4.
31 Ibid., p. 27-36.
32 Ibid., p. 34.
33 Ibid., p. 37.
34 Ibid., p. 39–40.
35 Ibid., p. 408.
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system, chosen categories have to be designed as a harmonized whole. “The 
most perfect of them must be unity with the previous two – action is only 
a symptom of a conscious thought, not the unity of thoughts and feelings”36
because that is creation. Dembowski sees what Cieszkowski omitted – if
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only a justifying rhetorical technique.
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but does not know that it knows, so its nature; 3) only the fully developed 
thought that knows and feels that it knows what and why it feels is creation – the 
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for instance: “thought as a thought is: 1) emotion, 2) thought, 3) creation.”, and
then in the footnote: “thought as a thought being creation is completely different 
to creation as creation being thought; the first one is organism, and the second 
knowledge”.39 But, what is most interesting is the author’s arrangement of 
history. After dividing it into 1) people of the east; 2) Hebrews, Greeks, Romans;
3) the history of Christian people,40 he says of the last period, “the third period
will be the future. It will develop according to the thought divisions, and finally 
knowledge will go in life”.41 He proposes this fractal historiosophical system of 
history that is never closed, always in movement and progressing towards the 
next whatever. He does not promote Polishness nor Slavs. He only describes 
the significance of history and states that the vacant position is up for grabs, 
history has not finished yet.
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Dembowski’s Slavic promotion is not an element of absolute spirit, but 
a necessary part of creating an environment for the creation of philosophy. It is 
an outer-philosophical condition of possibility philosophy being created by 
Poles. His attempt was not about predicting, or even creating via Polish national 
philosophy or messianism, the real future of Poland. He referred to deeply 
rooted, already existing Western philosophical tradition and lively feelings 
evoked by national sentiments. His heroic, truly romantic attempt was rather to 
project and create a new space for future Polish thought. Its aim was the Polish 
new intelligent class that didn’t yet exist but which would create modern society. 
Through all of his pedagogical attempts he tried to update the Polish soul into 
philosophy and independency. His attempt was about asking what philosophy is, 
at what point it currently is, what its competencies are and how we can justify its 
existence with our participation in the future. He does not ask wishfully how the 
future will look, but he tells us: if we want it to be with Polish philosophy, then 
we should create it.42 “Do not underestimate the work of centuries,” Dembowki 
states, “(...) let’s be their disciples, and when their knowledge becomes ours, 
let’s look at ourselves and through knowledge that already for us is true let’s 
expand, and we shall be on our way towards absolute progress”.43
Both French and German philosophical traditions were, as traditions, rooted in 
some sort of social environment. The nineteenth century was powered by the 
third state, by the bourgeoisie, which, at that time, did not exist in Poland. 
Dembowski was a landowner, Polish landed gentry, but the tradition he referred 
to was bourgeois. Western Europe built its thought on the basis of an existing or 
emerging middle class society. Dembowski built on a void. He made an attempt 
to build the basics for intellectual independence, which was not only intellectual 
independence, but Polish intellectual independence that was not fixated with the 
privileged God’s chosen nation, but simply with a self-conscious nation. The 
category of creation that is identical with being, a pedagogical, almost 
Enlightenment-like attempt to promote philosophy, the creation of new Polish 
philosophical dictionary, and later social criticism, were a great base for the 
announced philosophy of the future. If not for the author’s premature death, he 
probably would have made this the basis for the system objection against social 
evolutionism, a vision of the social doctrine of creativity as a system to promote 
an active, conscious participation in the creation of society and the collective 
determination of its future. What Dembowski was trying to do was, as
Brzozowski would call it, the impossible work or the impossible creation. He 
wanted to single-handedly create what should be the work of an entire nation, its 
self-consciousness.
42 Ibid., p. 109-111.
43 Ibid., p. 111.
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An attempt to update
From the perspective of a person that made an attempt to create a philosophy that 
would be both established in the contemporary philosophy of its time and remain 
an integral character of a nation, we can grasp some interesting intuitions. 
However, not all of these elements have to remain relevant, as philosophical 
qualities today. The most interesting is the question of the philosophical future: the 
immanent trace of its progress and its independence. Thus, the question about 
progress emerges. This can go in one of two ways: 1) philosophical progress 
might be in relation to other fields of studies i.e. religion, history or literature but 
most likely science, 2) philosophy will try to retain its integrity and its 
indetermination (it’s a little bit too late for independence). In the first case, we 
might predict that the engagement will be its determination. Science with its 
intense expansion, technical background, well-functioning international scientific 
community, well established division of labor, and its goal: specified and tangible 
success will dominate philosophical claim. Science will probably absorb 
philosophy, only if it has not happened yet, and its function will be to analyze on 
a more general level detailed information and build more general scientific
theories. In the second case, the question that philosophy asks itself about itself is 
a question of its progress. It is the question of its future, not in a determined 
manner but in a creation manner (by creation I do not mean here the recent 
commonly used and overused understanding of creation as creativity in a market-
determined way or arbitrarily constructed visions of philosophy of handicraft or 
housing design, but as a conscious, intentional act, according to some inner logic 
of the process). To avoid shallowness, thought must examine itself and recognize 
its own progress. Philosophy must avoid too strong relationships with other fields 
of knowledge. It cannot lose sight of understanding for its own progress, or else it 
will become merely a justifying rhetorical technique. In reference to Dembowski
and opposite to Smith we might say that the creation of philosophy should be its 
own creation, self-conscious creation that would be, at least to some extent, 
independent from the “simple process of modernization”. Dembowski’s question 
about philosophy and its self-consciousness is still relevant. It is a purely practical 
act: philosophy will be what we will make of it. Of course, that is almost an 
obvious answer. But more important is: what is philosophy and who will answer 
this question?
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KOTARBIŃSKI’S ONTOLOGY OF HUMANITIES 
Abstract. What is left of this initial project once Kotarbiński’s textbook became obsolete – as 
Kotarbiński himself claims, perhaps too modestly, in the preface of its second edition, in 1959 
– and also given the strong criticism of reism, particularly by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz [1966]? My
answer is that the philosophical project of reism then became a methodological framework for 
intellectual work in general, and in particular for humanistic studies, or what we today call the 
Human and Social Sciences. 
Keywords. Reism, ontology, humanities, nominalism, intellectual ethics, Ockam’s razor.
What were Kotarbiński’s aims with his first book, Elementy teorii poznania, 
logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk, published in 1929? Firstly, he wanted to 
provide a manual for the course, “Logic and General Methodology”, at the 
University of Warsaw, as he himself said in the preface. A second objective was 
to provide the initial formulation of a semantic and ontological theory, reism. 
This theory was meant to disseminate and promote Stanisław Leśniewski’s 
ontological theory. The idea of reism was to transform Leśniewski’s logical 
ontology into a broader metaphysical worldview and to apply it in different 
fields, among which was the methodological status of sciences. 
What is left of this initial project once Kotarbiński’s textbook became obsolete 
– as Kotarbiński himself claims, perhaps too modestly, in the preface of its
second edition, in 1959 – and also given the strong criticism of reism, 
particularly by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz [1966]? My answer is that the 
philosophical project of reism then became a methodological framework for 
intellectual work in general, and in particular for humanistic studies, or what we 
today call the Human and Social Sciences. I also think that Kotarbiński himself 
intended this as an objective for reism. This project is clearly expressed, in my 
opinion, in a paper by Kotarbiński, entitled “Humanistyka bez hipostaz. Próba 
eliminacji hipostaz ze świata pojęć nauk humanistycznych”, “The Humanities 
Without Hypostasis: An Attempt to Eliminate Hypostasis from the Domain of 
the Humanities”, published initially in 1952 (see KOTARBIŃSKI [1966]). 
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